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ABSTRACT
According to an estimate by the Satellite Industry Association,
the global space industry grew from $104 billion in 20041 to
about $322.7 billion in 2014.2 The figures encompass both satellite and non-satellite aspects of the space industry. The industry
grew by another four percent in the years 2014 to 2015 to an
estimated global industry revenue of $335.3 billion.3 With more
commercialization of outer space activities, the figures are expected to continue to grow at an exponential rate.
* LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M. (Air & Space Law), PhD; Professor Masao Sekiguchi
Fellow in Air & Space Law, Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University. The
author would like to extend his appreciations to Dr. Joseph N. Pelton and
Professor Ram S. Jakhu for their valuable comments. Comments are welcome
and the author may be reached at eng.see@mail.mcgill.ca.
1 Space Industry to Pass $100 Billion in 2004, Continued Growth Forecast, DEFENSEAEROSPACE.COM (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/
release/3/33063/space-industry-sales-seen-over-$100-bn-(feb.-5).html [https://
perma.cc/HDR9-5T4B].
2 SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (SIA), 2015 STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY REPORT 7 (2015), http://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Mktg15
-SSIR-2015-FINAL-Compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DMB-4MQ5].
3 SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (SIA), 2016 STATE OF THE SATELLITE INDUSTRY REPORT 7 (2016), http://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SSIR16Pdf-Copy-for-Website-Compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2AX-EDWM].
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More and more States and private actors are keen on the lucrative space business, not to mention space resources. With
more private participation in space activities driven by economic
incentives, there are bound to be issues of competition for and
exploitation—if not over-exploitation—of inherently limited
natural resources. One question that inevitably arises is whether
the current international legal framework on outer space is sufficiently established to cope with the pendulum swing from a
landscape once dominated by the States, typified by political
dominance and national pride, to one driven by economic interests, as well as to cope with problems arising from competition
for space resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
TEPHEN HAWKING ONCE REMARKED: “I believe that the
long-term future of the human race must be space4 . . . . Our
only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space.”5 Space adventure began as a State-dominated activity, but the scene has since
changed as commercialization of space takes shape.6 While
Hawking’s statements may not reflect the space activities when
they began in 1960, it certainly hints at future space activities.
Space activities are inherently “international in nature because of the physical characteristics of outer space and because
the sphere of operations of such activities”7—there is no international boundary when satellites are placed in orbit, when
satellites take images of the Earth by way of remote-sensing, and
when the International Space Station is “parked” in outer space.
After all, the exploration and use of outer space, including the

S

4 Michael Logarta, Humanity’s Future Depends on Empathy, Says Stephen Hawking,
GMA NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/
news/scitech/science/442105/humanity-s-future-depends-on-empathy-says-ste
phen-hawking/story/ [https://perma.cc/Z5B5-DWKA].
5 Clara Moskowitz, Stephen Hawking Says Humanity Won’t Survive Without Leaving
Earth, SPACE.COM (Aug. 10, 2010, 6:14 PM), https://www.space.com/8924-ste
phen-hawking-humanity-won-survive-leaving-earth.html [https://perma.cc/
4M4L-TG5C].
6 CARL E. BEHRENS, SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES: GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES, COMMERCIAL COMPETITION, AND SATELLITE EXPORTS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS
(2006); GEORGE V. D’ANGELO, AEROSPACE BUSINESS LAW 6 (1996); C. Brandon
Halstead, Hybrid Hops On (and Over) the Horizon: The Future Has Arrived, and Requires a New Look at Air and Space Law, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 775, 776–77
(2009).
7 Ram S. Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32
J. SPACE L. 31, 49 (2006).
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Moon and other celestial bodies, is the province of all mankind,
and outer space is not subject to national appropriation or sovereignty claims.8 When private entities carry out their activities
on the Earth, they are governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in
which they carry out the activities. In outer space, what laws are
to govern their activities?
Since the activities are international in nature, international
law prima facie applies. As it stands now, there are five international space treaties in place, namely, the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies
1967 (Outer Space Treaty); the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space 1968 (Rescue Agreement);9 the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects 1972 (Liability Convention);10 the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1975 (Registration Convention);11 and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1979
(Moon Agreement).12 The Outer Space Treaty is deemed to be
the “Constitution” of outer space as it lays down certain principles that are regarded as rules of customary international law.13
The five international space treaties were, however, drafted at
a time when space activities were solely within the province of
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. I–II,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]
(“by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means”).
9 Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570.
10 Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389.
11 Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695.
12 Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410.
13 Ram S. Jakhu & Yaw Otu M. Nyampong, International Regulation of Emerging
Modes of Space Transportation, SPACE SAFETY REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS 220 (Joseph N. Pelton & Ram S. Jakhu eds. 2010). The principles include: “(a) that the
exploration and use of the outer space must be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all mankind; (b) outer space and celestial bodies are free for
exploration and use by all States on the basis of equality and in accordance with
international law; (c) outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by any means; (d) States party to the Treaty are obliged not to
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kind of weapon of mass destruction; and (e) in the exploration and use of
outer space, States are to be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual
assistance and must conduct all their space activities with due regard for the corresponding interests of other States.” Id.
8
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the States.14 The treaties were not intended for private commercial activities in space.15 Speaking on the emerging aerospace
transport, authors Jakhu and Nyampong state that “no international space treaty specifically and effectively regulates space
safety.”16 While the statement was specifically made in relation
to aerospace transportation, it appears to be true and applies
with equal force to commercial space activities in general.17 The
same authors state further that the “current international space
treaties are insufficient for current and future space utilization
needs.”18
Whether the international legal framework is sufficient to
deal with commercialization of space activities would prima facie
depend on the nature of the activity concerned and the international law, if any, that applies to it. This article is, therefore, intended to examine a number of space activities and the legal
issues and implications that arose or might arise from their commercialization. While it would be beyond the scope of this article to examine every feasible issue, this article will examine
certain select issues and the impact of commercialization
thereof. Namely it will examine “orbit hoarding,” remote sensing, and space mining before concluding with some remarks on
the militarization of outer space.
II.

HOARDING OF ORBITAL POSITIONS AND RADIO
FREQUENCIES

The use of satellites has become virtually indispensable in our
daily lives. Their uses may be found in banking, global positioning systems, meteorological services, satellite broadcasting, satellite communications, rescue services, and many others.19
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW—A TREATISE 559 (2009).
RICKY J. LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MINERALS IN
OUTER SPACE 8 (Prof. Ram S. Jakhu ed., 2012).
16 Jakhu & Nyampong, supra note 13, at 222.
17 Sylvia Ospina, International Responsibility and State Liability in an Age of Globalisation and Privatisation, 27 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 479, 491 (2002) (“The texts of
the outer space treaties have not been amended since they were first drafted in a
context that is very different from to-day’s socio-economic and political contexts.
Whereas before a very limited number of States were involved in space activities,
today a growing number of States and corporations have launch capabilities, and
incentives to venture into a variety of space activities, including ‘tourism’ or space
flights paid for by private parties.”).
18 Jakhu & Nyampong, supra note 13, at 223.
19 G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961) (underlining the significance of satellite telecommunication by stressing the need to make communication by means
14
15
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However, to have such applications, one has to launch satellites
into space and place them in the relevant orbits.20 The significance of satellites to global telecommunications is witnessed in
the UN Resolution 1721(D), which unanimously declares that
satellite telecommunication services should be made available
on a global and nondiscriminatory basis.21 To operate satellite
telecommunication, one needs radio frequencies. Both radio
frequencies and geostationary earth orbital positions are, however, limited natural resources, as explicitly recognized in the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Constitution:
“Member States shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and any
associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit, are
limited natural resources and that . . . countries . . . may have equitable access to both, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of particular
countries.”22
With more economic development, particularly in the developing countries, there has been more demand for instantaneous, satellite-based communications.23 This may be seen in such
countries as China and India, which have large populations.24
Satellite-based communications have a number of advantages
of satellites “available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a
global and non-discriminatory basis.”).
20 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 72. (“There are several orbits from where
a satellite can operate. The geostationary orbit (GEO) is the most preferred and
used orbit. The 24-hour ‘visibility’ of a satellite in GEO makes it uniquely advantageous for telecommunications and certain other services. Other orbits, such as
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), have been used for
telecommunication satellite constellations, reconnaissance, early warning, science, and other purposes.”).
21 G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961).
22 Int’l Telecomm. Union Constitution art. 44.2 [hereinafter ITU Constitution], http://www.itu.int/en/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/constitutionsConventions/5.12.61.en.100.pdf [https://perma.cc/A95J-VNNU] (“In
using frequency bands for radio services, Member States shall bear in mind that
radio frequencies and any associated orbits, including the geostationary-satellite orbit,
are limited natural resources and that they must be used rationally, efficiently and
economically, in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations, so that
countries or groups of countries may have equitable access to those orbits and frequencies, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of particular countries.”) (emphasis added); see also Int’l
Telecomm. Union, Radio Reg. pmbl. (2012) [hereinafter ITU RR].
23 Ram S. Jakhu, Regulatory Process for Communications Satellite Frequency Allocations, HANDBOOK OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS, VOLUME 1 271 (Joseph N. Pelton et
al. eds. 2013).
24 MICHAEL C. MINEIRO, SPACE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN OUTER SPACE 89 (2012).
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over land-based infrastructure, particularly in terms of costs and
mass coverage. The term “equitable access” is not defined in the
ITU Constitution. However, some of the provisions therein suggest that the special needs of developing countries and the geographical location of certain States must be considered when
allocating and utilizing orbital positions and radio frequencies.
The provisions also suggest that member States may have equitable access only in conformity with the ITU Radio Regulations
(ITU RR).25 Due to the difficulties associated with any amendment of the ITU RR, equitable access has been affected in relation to some allotment plans only.26
The ITU allocates and allots radio frequencies on two bases:
the first-come-first-served basis and a priori frequency planning
basis.27 While the applications to the ITU for radio frequencies
and associated orbits are done by the States, with commercialization of space activities and the ensuing need for more orbital
positions and radio frequencies, the private sector will naturally
lobby their States to make such applications. The urge for more
frequencies and orbital positions even push the private entities
and their States to register first, regardless of when they will
launch the satellites, leading to what is termed a “gold rush” in
space.28 The move is significant, as registration comes with seniority and priority.29 There is no obligation on the part of the
relevant States to use the frequencies and orbital positions immediately—they have up to seven years to place a satellite into
orbit before losing their rights.30 Indeed, States are known to
Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 73.
Id. (“The limited change ‘can be attributed to the unwillingness of some
powerful member States of ITU to accept restrictions on their freedom of action
in the use of radio frequencies and orbital positions.’”).
27 Id. at 72; Jakhu, Regulatory Process, supra note 23, at 282–83 (the former is
based on Articles 9 and 11 of the ITU RR, while the latter is based on Appendices
30 and 30A (for broadcasting satellite service) and Appendix 30B (for fixed satellite service) of the ITU RR).
28 Peter de Selding, Signs of a Satellite Internet Gold Rush in Burst of ITU Filings,
SPACE NEWS (Jan. 23, 2015), http://spacenews.com/signs-of-satellite-internetgold-rush/ [https://perma.cc/EP7P-X2XU]; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Tiny
Tonga Seeks Satellite Empire in Space, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 1990), http://www.ny
times.com/1990/08/28/business/tiny-tonga-seeks-satellite-empire-in-space.html?
pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/FKN7-VLTE]; Dwayne A. Day, Tough Little
Spinner, THE SPACE REVIEW (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.thespacereview.com/arti
cle/1787/1 [https://perma.cc/246Y-ZGMY] (Tonga, a small island state in the
Pacific, actually notified the ITU for 16 orbital slots and ultimately obtained 6).
29 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 74 (early registration blocks the placing
of other satellites in the same location in the GEO).
30 ITU RR, supra note 22, art. 9.1.
25
26
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even resort to leasing satellites to keep their slots occupied.31
Some feared the gold rush in outer space would lead to the
prejudice of less-developed countries that had yet to have
spacefaring capability.32 While space-faring capability is not required to register, many developing States do not have the financial capability or markets large enough to justify the
purchase or use of, let alone sustaining the use of, satellite-based
communications at present. The registration of “paper satellites” is real and widespread,33 and their use goes against the
principle of nondiscriminatory exploration and use of outer
space.34 It also goes against the equitable use by developing
countries;35 it might be too late for those developing States to
find a slot in outer space by the time they have the financial
capability. Since the gold rush and the issue of paper satellites
does not only affect developing countries with no spacefaring
capability, but also other countries with such capabilities, particularly emerging space nations like China, India, and North Korea, the issue is likely to become more acute as time goes by
because there is a possibility of the international community
running out of the limited natural resource of orbital slots.
To prevent the issue from worsening, the ITU has adopted
some measures. One is the a priori measure which is intended
to ensure that developing as well as non-spacefaring States will
have their due share of frequencies and orbital positions when
the need arises in the foreseeable future.36 Another measure is
financial due diligence, under which States making applications
have to pay filing fees to the ITU for processing their applications.37 The third measure is administrative due diligence that
requires the States to provide evidence of seriousness of their
31 Peter de Selding, Eutelsat Leases Chinese Satellite at 11th Hour to Protect Orbital
Slot, SPACE NEWS (May 13, 2011), http://spacenews.com/eutelsat-leases-chinesesatellite-11th-hour-protect-orbital-slot/ [https://perma.cc/7563-SK2B].
32 As seen in the draft resolution submitted by Cameroon, Guinea, Kenya,
Libya, Rwanda, and Zambia to the Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-10) of the
ITU at Guadalajara, 4–22 October 2010.
33 Paper Tigers, The Scramble for Space Spectrum, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (July 15,
2003), http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/pp02/media_information/feature_satellite.html [https://perma.cc/C488-4B54]; Francis Lyall, Paralysis by
Phantom: Problems of the ITU Filing Procedures, 39 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 187 (1996); Jakhu, Regulatory Process, supra note 23, at 272.
34 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. I.
35 ITU Constitution, supra note 22, art. 44.2.
36 ITU RR, supra note 22, apps. 30, 30A, 30B (for broadcasting satellite service
in Appendices 30 and 30A and for fixed satellite service in Appendix 30B).
37 Id. art. 9.2B.1 n. 11.
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intention to establish a satellite network.38 The ITU RR also permits the ITU to cancel the frequency assignment if there is a
failure to bring it into use within the seven-year period.39 The
effectiveness of such measures, however, remains to be seen.40
Another possible measure under consideration is shortening the
period within which a State is to bring the radio frequency into
use. Notwithstanding the ITU’s proposal to cancel unused radio
frequencies,41 the ITU RR does not place any time limitation on
States’ continued occupation of frequencies and orbital slots after they have started using them.42 Further, the ITU does not
have any effective enforcement power.43 Thus, there remains, in
theory, the likelihood of frequencies and slots drying up as commercialization of space activities keeps growing, though it has
not materialized yet. The lack of mandatory international dispute resolution mechanisms within the ITU further complicates
the situation. Notwithstanding the existence of some diplomatic
negotiation procedures44 and arbitration procedures,45 as one
learned author in space law rightly points out, none of the provisions have ever been used.46 While noting that member States
have largely abided by the ITU regulations for the fear that any
38 By providing, among others, the identity of the satellite network and the
spacecraft manufacturer. ITU resolution 49, Annex 2 (1997).
39 ITU RR, supra note 22, art. 11.44.
40 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 75.
41 ITU RR, supra note 22, art. 13.6.b (providing a lengthy process by the Radiocommunication Bureau to cancel any unused assignment of radio frequencies,
subject to the decision of the Board); see also Int’l Telecomm. Union Radio Communication Bureau, Circular Letter CR/301 (May 1, 2009), https://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=S&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ah
UKEwidpoHhtv3RAhVpxYMKHXs2CtcQFggaMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww
.itu.int%2Fdms_pub%2Fitu-r%2Fmd%2F00%2Fcr%2Fcir%2FR00-CR-CIR-0301!!
MSW-E.doc&usg=AFQjCNFF70FZoLNn1FjfwBRlEyG9Iw44jw [https://perma.cc/
BVJ4-2MJ7] (a “threat” by the Radiocommunication Bureau in a Circular Letter
CR/301 dated May 1, 2009).
42 Jakhu, Regulatory Process, supra note 23, at 284.
43 Id.
44 ITU Constitution, supra note 22, art. 56 (providing for member states to
settle their disputes on questions relating to the interpretation or application of
the ITU Constitution, Convention, or Administrative Regulations (including ITU
RR) by negotiation, either via diplomatic channels or in accordance with procedures laid down in bilateral or multilateral treaties).
45 Id. art. 41; see also Int’l Telecomm. Union, Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol Additonal to the Int’l Telecomm. Convention, Montreux, 1965), http://www.itu.int/en/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary
/conferences/4.10.43.en.101.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBU5-FKQJ] (applying to
member States that are parties to the Protocol).
46 Jakhu, Regulatory Process, supra note 23, at 286.
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noncompliance might negatively affect their own individual or
collective self-interests, the same author is not very optimistic
about the future of such tradition.47
III.

REMOTE SENSING

The term “remote sensing” refers to “the sensing of the
Earth’s surface from space by making use of the properties of
electromagnetic waves emitted, reflected or diffracted by the
sensed objects.”48 Remote sensing may be used “for the purpose
of improving natural resources management, land use and the
protection of the environment,” among others.49 The functions
found in Principle I of the 1986 UN Resolution, which contains
the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space (Remote Sensing Principles 1986), are, however,
partial. Remote sensing provides scientific, industrial, civil, military, and individual users with high-resolution images for a number of uses, including defense and intelligence, transportation
and infrastructure planning, natural resource assessment, agriculture, disaster relief, and meteorological services.50 A significant difference between the known functions of remote sensing
and the definition in Principle I is that the latter does not cover
reconnaissance or military spying.
The conventional debates over remote sensing center on
three rights: the right (of the sensing States) to launch satellites
and the right to sense; the right of the sensing States to distribute the data and images; and the right of the sensed States to
obtain images.51 In respect to the first right, the conflict lies between the sensed States, which argue that their prior consent was
necessary, and the sensing States, which rely on the freedom of
exploration and use of outer space.52 The prior consent argument is premised upon the principle of State sovereignty over its
Id. at 287.
Principle I of the UN Principles relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space 1986 (Remote Sensing Principles 1986), as adopted in G.A.
Res. 41/65, UN Doc A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Remote Sensing
Principles 1986].
49 Id.
50 See generally Atsuyo Ito, Improvement to the Legal Regime for the Effective Use of
Satellite Remote Sensing Data for Disaster Management and Protection of the Environment,
34 J. SPACE L. 45 (2008) (discussing uses and legal implications of remote
sensing).
51 Ram S. Jakhu, International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemination of
Satellite Imagery, 29:1 J. SPACE L. 65, 73 (2003).
52 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art I.
47
48
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territory and natural resources thereon.53 The passing of Principle I of the UN Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the
Earth from Outer Space (Remote Sensing Principles 1986)
marked a compromise between the sensing and sensed States—
the latter gave up their demand for prior consent in exchange
for the clear recognition of their rights to have access (on a nondiscriminatory basis and at reasonable costs) to the primary and
processed data concerning their territory, while the former may
exercise remote sensing in reliance upon the freedom of use of
outer space.54 With hindsight, it is debatable if the sensing States
were right to rely on the freedom of exploration and use of
outer space as enshrined in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty
1967, for it is trite that the freedom of exploration and use is in
respect of outer space and it is debatable if the Earth is part of
outer space. After all, when one tries to delimit the boundary
between the airspace and outer space, one looks at outer space
from the Earth and not from the Moon or any other celestial bodies. Thus, it is debatable if such freedom implies the right to
“reverse-view” the Earth and take images thereof from outer
space.
The second right revolves around the debates between two
opposing camps: the first was based upon the freedom of action
of the sensing State to sense, and thereafter distribute the products of sensing; and the second which emphasized sovereignty
over natural resources of the sensed States. The first view was
advocated by the United States and some of its Western allies,
while the second was advocated by the USSR, France, and developing countries.55 The third right centers on the right of the
sensed States, because their territories are sensed, to be entitled
to the data and images produced—an extension of the principle
of State sovereignty. The debates surrounding the rights have
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Security Over Natural Resources (Dec.
14, 1962) (“Permanent sovereignty over natural resources . . . 1. The right of
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of
the well-being of the people of the State concerned.”) Thus, the sensed states
argued that their prior consent was required in order to sense and distribute the
data and images.
54 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 76.
55 Jakhu, International Law, supra note 51, at 78; see also Convention on the
Transfer and Use of Data of Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space,
reprinted in EDMUND OSMANCYZK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 1714 (Anthony Mango, ed. 2003) (signed by a limited
number of mainly the former Communist States).
53
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been widely discussed.56 The following discussions would focus
on issues arising from the commercialization of remote-sensing
activities.
While one of the functions of remote sensing is reconnaissance and while such task lies traditionally with the State, certain
States have been able to make use of commercialization of remote sensing for their reconnaissance needs. Satellites in general and remote-sensing satellites in particular have a dual-use
nature.57 An officially civil and commercial satellite may, unknown to others, be used for military purposes as well. Such
dual use is of particular significance to intelligence gathering, as
certain States may want to, on the one hand, discover the military activities of their enemies or simply spy on other States, and
on the other hand, maintain secrecy of their military reconnaissance satellites. By encouraging commercialization of remote
sensing, States may gather data and images and cite the civilian
satellites as the source without exposing their military satellites.
While commercial entities might be willing to provide national
service, they certainly want something in return. Thus, they want
protection for the data they gather and images that they produce. In other words, they want intellectual property rights
(IPRs) over their works.
Granting IPR protection over remote sensing data and images
may run into international legal problems. First, the grant of
IPRs is usually limited in territorial scope. In other words, a
State can only grant IPRs protection within its territory. Since
outer space is not subject to territorial claim, it is questionable
whether data gathered in outer space, and the images produced
(even though processed and produced on the Earth), can be
protected by national IPRs.58 Second, granting IPR protection
over remote sensing data runs contrary to the principles enshrined in the Remote Sensing Principles 1986. In particular,
Principle II thereof states that remote sensing activities “shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic, social or scientific and
technological development, and taking into particular consider56

Jakhu, International Law, supra note 51, at 73; Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note

7.
Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 81.
Jakhu, International Law, supra note 51, at 66–67 (“Operating space systems
and taking images, which essentially occur in outer space, must be supplemented
by ground-based activities for appropriate data processing and interpretation in
order to make the satellite imagery practically useful.”).
57
58
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ation the needs of the developing countries.”59 Further, Principle II states that such activities “shall be conducted in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the relevant instruments
of the International Telecommunication Union.”60 None of
these instruments expressly permit States to grant IPR protection over remote sensing data and images.
While the term “international law” would certainly cover the
Berne Convention on copyrights,61 as stated above, such rights
under said convention remain territorial in nature and would
apparently not extend to outer space, where no sovereignty or
jurisdiction lie. Protection of remote sensing data and images
produced by private entities aside, States may also wish to limit
the right of other States or entities to obtain the raw data. The
justifications in national legislation would traditionally be premised upon such illusive concepts as national security, foreign
policy, or international obligations that are often undefined.62
While the restrictions imposed may be perceived as necessary to
protect a State’s national interests, it is a double-edged sword—
it restricts foreign access to the data, but it may also hamper
domestic access to the use of the data and images.63 Such restrictions may even hamper the development of new products and
services.64 Any unilateral imposition of arbitrary restrictions on
the collection and distribution of remote sensing data solely on
the ground of national interests is clearly contrary to the Remote Sensing Principles 1986.65 Further, due to the dual-use nature of remote sensing satellites, they could become the first
targets of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon strikes not only during
Remote Sensing Principles 1986, supra note 48 (emphasis added).
Id.
61 Berne Convention, July 24, 1971, 1971 U.S.T. Lexis 263, 25 U.S.T. 1341.
62 See Remote Sensing Space Systems Act § 8(6), (7) S.C. 2005, c 45 (Can.)
(which gives the relevant Minister the discretion to control distribution of data);
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C.A. § 5601, Pub. L. 102-555
(repealed 2010); 2006 Regulations on Licensing of Private Land RS Space Systems, 15 C.F.R. § 960.12 (West 2006); Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 58, 77.
The state which ironically has always “ardently advocated the freedom of acquisition and non-discriminatory dissemination of satellite imagery” became the first
state to impose extensive legal prohibitions on the collection and distribution. See
id. at 78–79.
63 A burden would be imposed on remote-sensing operators to obtain authorization in the event they wish to sell the data or images on every case.
64 Ram S. Jakhu et al., Findings of an Independent Review of Canada’s Remote Sensing Space Systems Act of 2005, 37 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 399, 410 (2012).
65 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 80.
59
60
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an actual war but also in anticipation of hostilities.66 Notwithstanding the risks associated with remote sensing, there appears
to be nothing much that the international community can do,
partly due to the limited scope of the Remote Sensing Principles
1986, as well as their non-binding nature.67
IV.

SPACE MINING

While activities on the Moon have virtually ceased since the
Moon Agreement came into being, advancements in science
have recently demonstrated that outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, has more natural resources
than mankind thought. What is the legality of space mining in
international law? Article I of the Outer Space Treaty is not entirely clear on this issue. Speaking on the exploration and use of
outer space, including celestial bodies, the Outer Space Treaty
appears to be silent on exploitation of resources in outer space.
The provision on freedom of scientific investigation reminds the
reader of the old space age when space activities were dominated by the States that were more concerned with national
prestige and international domination marked by their explorative space activities.68
Like many of its provisions, the provision on exploitation and
use, as well as scientific investigation, are further elaborated in
the Moon Agreement, Articles 6.2 and 11 specifically.69 The two
Articles are not against private initiatives, investments, or interId. at 81.
There are two schools of thought on this point. There are those who believe
that the Remote Sensing Principles 1986 are part of the customary international
law. See Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War
in Space, 48 A.F.L. REV. 1, 72 (2000); and those who argue otherwise. Michael
Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Canada’s Remote Sensing Program and Policies, in
COMMERCIAL OBSERVATION SATELLITES: AT THE LEADING EDGE OF GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY 263, 287 n.4 (John C. Baker et al. eds., 2001).
68 See Robin McKie, Alexei Leonov, the First Man to Walk in Space, THE GUARDIAN
(May 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/may/09/alexei-leo
nov-first-man-to-walk-in-space-soviet-cosmonaut [https://perma.cc/8XYE-SWM3]
(first human space walk by Alexei Leonov); The First Person on the Moon, NASA
(Jan. 16, 2008), https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/firstperson-on-moon.html [https://perma.cc/UK4N-QTSQ] (first human to walk on
the Moon); Lunar Rocks and Soils from Apollo Missions, NASA, https://curator.jsc.
nasa.gov/lunar/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/N4UE-5PD9] (last visited Jan. 23,
2017) (return of Apollo missions with soil samples taken form the Moon between
1969 and 1972).
69 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 103–04.
66
67
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ests.70 Despite its attempts to clarify the Outer Space Treaty, the
Moon Agreement has attracted very few ratifications, with the
United States, Russia, China, and other major spacefaring States
not even being signatories to it.71 The recently rekindled interests in resources on the Moon and other celestial bodies are reflected inter alia in the U.S. Space Resource Exploration and
Utilization Act of 201572 (the Act) which purports to gives ownership and title to resources mined in outer space to private entities with the legal ability to transfer the ownership. The Act is
purportedly based on the difference between “national” appropriation (interpreted by the proponents of the Act to mean “the
State” itself) and appropriation by private entities (interpreted
by the proponents of the Act to mean “non-State”).73
Many arguments, however, militate against the position of the
Act. First, “ ‘[n]ational appropriation’ must be understood in a
broader sense to include all forms of appropriation, including
appropriation by the public, private or otherwise.”74 “The Outer
Space Treaty imposes an international responsibility on States
for national activities in space” without differentiating activities
by State or non-State actors.75 The travaux préparatoires of the
Treaty supports such an argument. The USSR had initially opposed the United States’s position of opening outer space to private activities but ultimately accepted possible participation of
private entities in the exploration and use of outer space upon
the condition that such entities must have been authorized by
the applicable States, which would continue to supervise them.76
Thus, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is said to represent a
compromise between the two opposing positions, with the result
of non-governmental national space activities being assimilated
Id. at 104.
Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, UN OFFICE
OF OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS (Jan. 1, 2010) http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications
/ST_SPACE_11_Rev2_Add3E.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YJZ-6BZW] (Australia is
apparently the only space-faring country that has ratified the Moon Agreement.
France and India have signed it but have refrained from ratifying it).
72 51 U.S.C. §§ 51301–51303 (2015).
73 Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L.
REV. 349, 351 (1969).
74 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 44.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 44–45; Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: ‘International Responsibility,’ ‘National Activities,’ and ‘The Appropriate State’, 26:1 J. SPACE L.
7, 14 (1998) (quoting W. B. Wirin, Practical Implications of Launching State—Appropriate State Definitions 37 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 109, 110 (1994)).
70
71
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to governmental space activities.77 The Belgian and French representatives noted without contradiction that non-appropriation
covered both claims of sovereignty and “the creation of titles to
property in private law.”78 Allowing private entities to appropriate outer space or a part of it would defeat not only Article II,79
but also render Article I meaningless.80 Lastly, it was apparently
supported by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s remarks when
presenting the Outer Space Treaty to the Senate for consent for
ratification.81
Without casting any opinion on the legislation, there may be
several ways to relook at the history. First, Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty refers to “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”
The words seem to suggest appropriation of land because of the
words “use or occupation” and “sovereignty.” The difference between land and resources lies in fact that while land would remain there despite use or occupation, resources would be
consumed and depleted.82 Second, the USSR insisted on national authorization and continued supervision of private space
activities without even touching on the issue of “appropriation,”
whether of land, resources, or otherwise. Third, the remarks by
the Belgian and French representatives appear to refer to “the
creation of titles to property in private law.”83 It remains unclear if
the term “property” refers to titles in land, or things found in or
on the land. The term “property” has a specific meaning to common law-trained lawyers, especially English lawyers. It primarily
refers to real property as opposed to personal property or chattels. It is unclear if the same difference is drawn in civil law. In
any event, when it comes to international treaty negotiations,
confusions over terminology are inevitable and abound, more so
77 Cheng, supra note 76, at 14 n.17 (quoting Bin Cheng, Chapter 9 The Space
Treaty, in BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 237 (1997)).
78 Carl Christol, Art. 2 of the 1967 Treaty Principles Revisited, 9 ANNALS OF AIR &
SPACE L. 217, 236 (1984).
79 Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 45 (providing for comprehensive prohibition of appropriation).
80 Id.
81 “Today, outer space is free . . . No nation holds a concession there. It must
remain this way . . . [The United States] do[es] not acknowledge that there are
landlords of outer space who can . . . bargain with the nations of the Earth on the
price of access to this domain.” Treaty on Outer Space: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong. 105–06 (1967).
82 LEE, LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 6 (speaking in relation to depletion of natural resources on the Earth).
83 Christol, supra note 78 (emphasis added).

160

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[82

when a legal term is translated from one language to another
and from one legal tradition to another.84 Thus, with all respect,
Manfred Lachs’s personal conclusion that national appropriation includes sovereign and private rights should, in light of differences in legal traditions and terminology, be taken with a
grain of salt.85 Fourth, the statement made by President Johnson
was apparently an internal statement and can be construed as
merely a unilateral declaration of a State which, under international law, may be unilaterally withdrawn. In passing the
amended Act in 2015, the United States can be taken as having
withdrawn its unilateral declaration.86 Thus, if the arguments in
support of non-appropriation under Article II fall, it is debatable how the argument under Article I would stand if private interests are focused on resources on a first-come-first-extract
basis, regardless of who has any title to the land concerned.87
After all, while the proponents of space mining may not have
any sovereignty or jurisdiction claim over the lands on the
Moon, the opponents do not either.
Another pertinent issue is the interpretation of Article IX of
the Outer Space Treaty which provides, inter alia, that the State
Parties shall have due regard to the corresponding interests of
all other State Parties when conducting activities in outer space,
presumably including the exploration and use of outer space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Further, the
fourth sentence thereof provides that if a State Party “has reason
84 E.g., in the Cape Town Convention, the term “administrator in insolvency”
(a term more familiar to Civil lawyers) as opposed to “trustee in bankruptcy” (a
term more commonly found in the Common Law) was adopted. See International
Institute on the Unification of Private Law, Convention on International Interests
in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention), Art. I(k), S. Treaty Doc. No.
108-10 (Nov. 16, 2001), http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobileequipment/mobile-equipment.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2W2-BNCC].
85 See Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 46. For the different terms used in
different language texts, see LEE, LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 181.
86 Modern politico-economics suggests that States and their nationals are no
longer interested in claiming sovereignty to particular lands and instead are
more interested in resources. States are happy to give up sovereignty after resources are exhausted or when the occupied land no longer serves any interests,
as seen in the case of Portugal giving up Timor Leste. The resources available
may no longer justify the costs of maintaining colonial administration, let alone
maintaining the claim to sovereignty. Jose Ramos-Horta, History of Timor-Leste,
http://ramoshorta.com/about-timor-leste/ [https://perma.cc/F93W-V5FY] (last
visited Jan. 23, 2017).
87 Surely, there would be the issue of disputes over areas mined when space
mining materializes and there is no international legal framework to cope with
such disputes.
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to believe that an activity . . . planned by another State Party in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity.”88 It is curious to note that notwithstanding
the planned exploitation of space resources by some of the
spacefaring States, no State Parties to the Outer Space Treaty
have sought consultation, either the spacefaring States nor the
non-spacefaring States. As far as the former is concerned, national interests dictate that there should perhaps not be any international protests, for the States concerned are either eyeing
the space resources themselves or are already putting plans in
place.89
As for the non-spacefaring States, any request for international consultation would probably be to no avail. The discretion
on the part of a State Party potentially affected by the space activities of another State Party as provided for in the fourth sentence stands perhaps in contrast to the duty on the part of the
State Party whose space activity planned by it or its nationals in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other State Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space, to undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity.90 While the land on
the Moon and other celestial bodies are perpetual,91 resources
thereon may be consumed and vanish thereafter. Thus, the mining activities authorized under the Act would presumably cause
potentially harmful interference with the space activities of
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
China, for instance, is said to have announced plans to establish a permanent Moon base to mine rare-Earth elements and Helium-3, a non-radioactive
isotope that is energy rich. Mary-Ann Russon, China Wants to Visit Mars by 2020
and Beat NASA to Set Up the First Manned Moon Base, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 22,
2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/china-wants-visit-mars-by-2020-beat-nasaset-firstmanned-moon-base-1556304 [https://perma.cc/QVT2-22MT]; Jeremy Beck,
China’s Helium-3 Program: A Global Game Changer, SPACE SAFETY MAG. (Mar. 16,
2016), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-on-earth/everyday-life/
china-helium-3-program/ [https://perma.cc/22AF-ME24].
90 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX (third sentence).
91 This is much like the lands on the Earth which are presumed in theory to be
perpetual, thus, giving rise to freehold titles, barring any interstellar collision.
RICHARD T. ELY, CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATIN OF LAND Vol. 1, 20 (2d ed.
1922) (quoting STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, LAW OF PROPERTY LAND (2d ed. London,
1909)).
88
89
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other State Parties. Where there is competition for resources
there is potential breach of peace. In such a situation, it would
appear that there would be a reason for the United States to be
under a duty to “undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity.” It remains unclear if the United States is prepared to undertake such
international consultations which might very well cripple space
mining by its nationals ab initio. Notwithstanding the lack of exercise of a State’s duty in Article IX, the failure to exercise a
State’s discretion to seek consultation may equally bring some
legal issues, particularly when States dispute over their rights to
mine a certain celestial body or an area thereon.
The Outer Space Treaty aside, do the Moon Agreement provisions represent rules of customary international law? It was
unanimously passed by the UN General Assembly without a
vote.92 It is argued that its low amount of signatories may simply
represent the total lack of activities on the Moon for the past
thirty years, and States’ reluctance to adhere to a treaty which
has no practical significance to them, particularly those nonspacefaring States.93 On the other hand, the non-ratification appears to evidence conscious State will, particularly on the part of
spacefaring States, not to be part of the Moon Agreement. Otherwise they would be bound by the Common Heritage of Mankind provision, their actions in outer space would be restricted,
and they could not fully exploit and be entitled to resources recovered in outer space.94 Further, the phrase “benefits derived
from those resources” is wide and ambiguous.95 “Benefits” can
very well mean the raw materials mined or recovered, minerals
derived from such raw materials, technology used, and the IPRs
of the technology used.96 It remains unclear if private entities,
having invested millions of dollars into the mining mission,
would be willing to share the benefits with other entities or
States which have contributed nothing, let alone the technology.
Further, there is no defined formula for “equitable” sharing,
and that is bound to give rise to disputes.97 In any event, the
As duly noted in LEE, LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 112.
Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 104–05.
94 See id. at 104 (summarizing the U.S. interpretation of the Common Heritage
of Mankind provision).
95 Moon Agreement, supra note 12, art. 11.7.d.
96 LEE, LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 157, 262 (drawing the difference between the means and the results).
97 Id. at 15.
92
93
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international community has failed to establish the mechanism
envisaged in Article 11.7 thereof. Thus, space mining is not met
with a corresponding framework of international space law.98
What would be the impact if States permit their nationals to
conduct mining in outer space? An analogy may perhaps be
made with the Western European powers fighting for colonies
and resources in Africa, the Americas, and Asia in the 19th and
early 20th centuries. While States may not encounter hostilities
for the purpose of establishing colonies in outer space, for such
would be clearly contrary to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,
there would be nothing to prevent them from facing off against
one another for the purpose of obtaining resources.99 The
Moon Agreement provides a mechanism for equitable sharing
of benefits, but how many States are prepared to share such benefits? Indeed, it is arguable that it is the very mechanism of equitable sharing that might have prevented its widespread
acceptance. When the fight for resources takes place in outer
space, it may serve as the raison d’état for spacefaring States to
arm themselves in space, thus potentially bringing military conflicts to the space.
V.

CONCLUSION

Many military conflicts and wars arose as result of competition
for resources.100 Such competition arose, in the past, between
the States. In modern time, private entities compete for re98 Ricky J. Lee, The Jus ad Bellum in Spatialis: The Exact Content and Practical
Implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space, 29 J. SPACE L. 93, 93 (2003).
99 Modern examples of fights for resources though in name of sovereignty include: the disputes among China, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian States over the
Spratly Islands and the war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the
Falkland Islands. It is trite that, in these two instances, petroleum and fishery are
among the interests couched in the name of sovereignty. See Michael Bennett,
The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands
Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 425, 425 (1992); Roberto Laver, The Falklands/
Malvinas: A New Framework for Dealing with the Anglo-Argentine Soveregnty Dispute, 25
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 147, 148–49 (2001).
100 Prominent examples include both World War I (WWI) and World War II
(WWII). See Martin Kelly, The Top Causes That Lead to World War I, ABOUT.COM,
http://americanhistory.about.com/od/worldwari/tp/causes-of-world-war-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/C35H-KXPD] (last visisted Jan. 24, 2017) (noting that imperialism and desire for raw materials in Africa was a cause of WWI); Jeremy Noakes,
Hitler and ‘Lebensraum’ in the East, BBC: HISTORY (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml [https://per
ma.cc/K7NE-9XC6] (explaining that the German concept of Lebensraum to acquire land for German people led to invasion of the Soviet Union).
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sources for personal gain, and in one way contribute to national
economic development. By that, they become the proxies of the
States.101 The same may transpose to outer space with the commercialization of space activities. When private entities compete
for resources in outer space, the States may intervene in the
name of protecting national interests. Notwithstanding the UN
Charter (particularly Article 2.4 on refraining from the use of
force) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 1970 which repeats the principle of refraining from use of force, spacefaring
States may wish to preclude or eliminate competition for space
resources,102 or space-generated revenues, such as competition
for space launch services.103
Competition for space resources aside, remote sensing is another problem as it may pose national security concerns, as seen
in the U.S. Kyl-Bingaman Amendment which inter alia, upon the
request of Israel, threatens to use ASAT weapons104 to shoot
101 Such instances are not limited to modern times. Competition for resources
and colonies led to the WWI. The failure of the League of Nations led in turn to
the WWII, which was due partly to the dissatisfaction of Germany with the postWWI treaty, and partly the loss of its colonies after the WWI and its inability since
then to obtain new colonies overseas. The formation of the European Coal and
Steel Community post-WWII might be partly attributed to the need to prevent
competition for resources and markets among the Western European powers.
102 See U.S. Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, supra note
72.
103 Other countries that offer commercial launch services in competition with
US include Europe, China, Russia, Ukraine, India, and Japan. BEHRENS, supra
note 6, at 9. It, thus, explains why the United States entered into bilateral agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and China as the agreements provided for the “rules
of the games” for participating in the launch service market to ensure those three
countries did not offer unfair competition as result of state subsidies or nonmarket economies. Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra note 7, at 66–69. Quotas for Russia
and Ukraine were terminated in 2000. BEHRENS, supra note 6, at 14–15. The
agreement with China expired in 2001. Id. at 10. China, with its Long March
launch vehicles, was able to price lower than the Western countries, particularly
the United States. China’s explanation was its own low cost. Id. at 11. India did
not fare better either. The United States, through the threats of sanction, forced
Russia to cease transferring space launch technologies to India to prevent India
from becoming a competitor in launch services market: Jakhu, Legal Issues, supra
note 7, at 61; BEHRENS, supra note 6, at 14.
104 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, § 1064, 110 Stat.
2422 (1996) (enacted). The other types of space weapons include ballistic missiles, space-based lasers (though it is debatable whether such “space-based” weapons would constitute stationing weapons in outer space, contrary to Article IV of
the Outer Space Treaty 1967), and conventional kinetic weapons. Robert David
Olney, Death from Above? The Weaponization of Space and the Threat to International
Humanitarian Law, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 739, 746, 752–53 (2013).
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down remote sensing satellites.105 Other provisions include disallowing the U.S. satellite operators to collect or distribute certain types of satellite imagery of Israel’s territory, and not
permitting the relevant persons to declassify or otherwise release
satellite imagery with respect to Israel of certain precision.106
Spacefaring States have increased their military use of outer
space. In the United States, it began with President Reagan’s
star wars in 1984.107 The European Union is also moving toward
militarization of space.108 Japan not so long ago passed a law
permitting military space development.109 India scaled up its
105 There have been several instance of the use of ASAT weapons, for example,
in the United States in 1985. See Peter Grier, The Flying Tomato Can, AIR FORCE
MAG. (Feb. 2009), http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/
February%202009/0209tomato.aspx [https://perma.cc/T55B-ZH7E]); in China
in 2007 (Leonard David, China’s Worrisome Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud
Circles Earth, SPACE.COM (Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.space.com/3415-china-antisatellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html [https://perma.cc/22PYNDWT]. An instance occurred again in 2008. See Gregory Kulacki, The United
States, China, and Anti-Satellite Weapons, ALL THINGS NUCLEAR BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016
9:47 AM), http://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/the-united-states-china-and-antisatellite-weapons [https://perma.cc/P8QD-H43W]. They were clear showings of
military force in space.
106 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, supra note 104,
recounted in Jakhu, International Law, supra note 51, at 80 n.47.
107 This became Clinton’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, which was
renamed the Missile Defense Agency in 2002. David Edward Gronan, Power Play:
Theater Ballistic Missle Defense, National Ballistic Missle Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39
VA. J. INT’L L. 799, 816 (1999); Development in Brief, 44 No. 1 Gov’t Contractor
4 (Jan. 9, 2002). In its National Space Policy 2010, the United States’s so-called
principles in space are stated, among others, to be that: “The United States will
employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for all responsible
parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the defense
of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack them.”
ROBERT GATES, THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE U.S. 3 (2011). The National Missile
Defense Act of 1999 states, inter alia: “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense
system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with
funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual
appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.” Pub. L. No. 106-38, 113
Stat. 205 (1999).
108 FRANK SLIJPER, FROM VENUS TO MARS —THE EU’S STEPS TOWARDS THE
MILITARISATION OF SPACE (2008).
109 Paul Kallender-Umezu, Japan Passes Law Permitting Military Space Development, RP DEFENSE (June 23, 2012), http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/article-japanpasses-law-permitting-military-space-development-107325787.html [https://per
ma.cc/N876-W7R6].
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military use of space.110 Israel–a small country with just 8 million
people—has the capability to manufacture and launch its own
satellites; it is the military activities in space that drive its space
program.111 The increased military activities and weaponization
in outer space may be interpreted as preemption of any challenge to certain States’ monopoly in space and, if necessary, as a
means to resolve such challenges.
While Stephen Hawking might be right in saying that mankind must spread out to outer space and the commercialization
of space activities has certainly echoed his sentiment, commercialization appears to have many multifaceted implications. The
implications were perhaps unforeseen at the time when the five
space treaties were drafted and, thus, not catered to. Further,
the current international space law regime does not appear to
be sufficient to cope with them either.112 The crucial problem
with the current international space regime lies perhaps with its
emphasis on the acts or activities of space actors as opposed to
the overall space governance framework.113
Assuming that some kind of international or global space governance is desirable, what form should it take? There were previous calls for the establishment of a World Space
Organization.114 In light of increasing commercialization of
space activities, one issue that invariably arises is whether there
110 India to Scale Up Military Use of Space: Army Chief, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERV.
(June 16, 2008), http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/India+to+scale+up+military+
use+of+space:+Army+chief/1/9916.html [https://perma.cc/27HY-A8CX].
111 Marc Boucher, Military Space Drives Israel Space Program for Now, SPACEREF
CANADA (Sept. 5, 2012), http://spaceref.ca/space-exploration-1/space-quarterly
/military-space-drives-israel-space-program-for-now.html [https://perma.cc/FY
N3-8S92].
112 Lee, The Jus ad Bellum in Spatialis, supra note 98, at 93.
113 By analogy with the legal framework of a State, there is the constitution,
and under it laws that regulate both the public and private activities. While the
Outer Space Treaty may be touted as the “Constitution of outer space,” it falls far
short of that. Further, the international space legal framework does not have any
or sufficient laws to cater for private acts and activities. Ramey, supra note 67, at
74 (Outer Space Treaty is the “constitution” of outer space).
114 E. Kamenetskaya, On the Establishment of World Space Organisation: Some Considerations and Remarks, 32 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 358 (1989); Simon Courteix,
Is It Necessary to Establish a World Space Organisation?, 36 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE
20 (1993); René H. Mankiewicz, The Regulation of Activities in Extra-Aeronautical
Space, and Some Related Problems, 8.3 MCGILL L.J. 193, 200–04 (1961) (proposing,
among others, regulatory powers on rules required for the conduct of peaceful
activities in space, jurisdiction over space vehicles, and promotion of joint operations in space, for the new international space authority); Stephen Gorove, An
Old Proposal for the Establishment of a World Space Law Center, 20 PROC. ON L. OUTER
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should be a technical/operation and economic divide as in the
context of international civil aviation.115 While the World Trade
Organization (WTO) arguably has the jurisdiction to deal with
trade in goods and services in commercial space activities, it appears to have focused its time and efforts on liberalization in
aviation and telecommunications services only. Surely, the WTO
has many more pressing trade issues to deal with, and the space
industry concerns primarily a handful of States though the benefits of space technologies affect all of mankind. Whether the
international or global space governance should include economic regulation is akin to the debates over whether liberalization in international air transport should be handled by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) or WTO. It is
a serious issue for policy makers. There is at least a case for a
combined technical and economic regulatory body.
Compared to the aviation industry, the space industry remains
in its incipient stage. Unlike the international air transport industry in the early twentieth century, the space industry is more
than just the transportation of people and cargo. There are
many more complicated issues in outer space now: satellite communications, space mining, solar energy, and global positioning,
just to name a few. The International Convention on Civil Aviation negotiated at Chicago in 1944 and the resulting ICAO have
been lamented for lacking economic regulatory power.116
With hindsight, it might be a good idea to have an international space body with both technical and economic regulatory
oversight, if one were ever created. The question is, however,
not so much what sort of new organization to establish, or what
additional jurisdiction and power to give to an existing organization,117 but whether it (either a new or existing organization)
will be given extra and sufficient jurisdiction and powers that
SPACE 40 (1977) (which proposes the establishment of a world space law center
which study the present and expected scopeand field of space law).
115 In the context of international civil aviation, while the General Agreement
on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has deferred liberalization in air transport in light of the bilateral systems, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) does not possess any power on this matter either.
The ICAO’s functions and powers are confined to technical or operational matters. BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ERA IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 123 (1997).
116 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Competition in Air Transport—The Need for a Shift in
Focus, 33 TRANSP. L. J. 29, 32, 36 (2005).
117 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 571 (increasing power and authority to
the ITU).
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are not otherwise available under existing treaties and will thus
be able to solve current and future problems, particularly with
increasing commercialization of space activities.118 Such
problems include more efficient and fairer allocation of orbital
slots and radio frequencies for the purpose of satellite telecommunications, expansion of Article 11.5 of Moon Agreement for
the purpose of space mining, space debris issues, non-spacefaring States’ access to information obtained by remote-sensing,
and disputes between commercial entities.119
Surely, the most pertinent issue is whether States are willing to
cede more powers to an international organization that might
entail more curtailment on their freedom of actions in space.120
For instance, would States want such an international organization to have say on militarization of space?121 With the absence
of a legally binding treaty or international space organization,
cooperation between States is imperative for the time being.122
118 Carl Q. Christol, Alternative Models for a Future International Space Organisation, 24 PROC. ON L. OUTER SPACE 173 (1981); Courteix, supra note 114, at 23.
119 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 573. Current space treaties lack in substance and are focused on disputes between States: Article XIII of the Outer
Space Treaty, Articles XIV–XX of the Liability Convention, and Article 15 of the
Moon Agreement, for instance.
120 Kamenetskaya, supra note 114, at 359 (speaking on the United States’s reluctance to improve international cooperation in outer space as the then existing
forms and methods of multilateral and bilateral cooperation met the political
and commercial interests of the United States).
121 Courteix, supra note 114, at 20, 26.
122 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 563.

